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                            Introduction 
    G.J.Stigler, who is a representative economist of the Chicago School, once 
compared the pleasures ofCapitalism with the pains of Capitalism, and concluded that 
the government should promote deregulation and call for a return to an open, 
competitive economy. In this paper, he argued about he regulated sector as the biggest 
source of all growth industries and concluded that all consumers had become losers under 
a "myopic Robin Hood" (=modern state), which has intervened economy without 
explicit rational reasons. 
   Since the victory of the Chicago School in the 1980s, the leading countries such as 
the US and the UK have pursued Deregulation a d Privatization policies boldly and the
* Tetsuzo Yamamoto is a professor of Economic Theory at Graduate School of 
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other advanced countries followed them with similar policies. But, except for common-
law countries, other advanced countries have different views of public choice based on 
social democracy and traditional public governances characterized by their own culture. 
Therefore, the "road to freedom" has not proceeded straightforward. This tide has been 
modified and integrated into the world-wide "Regulatory Reform Initiatives" mainly 
advocated by the OECD. We are now on the way to such a regulatory reform. 
              1. Factors of Recent Economic Recovery in Japan 
A. Economic Recovery 
    Japan has finally emerged from an extended period of economic stagnation in the 
lost decade. The GDP growth rate in FY2005 was 3.2% in real term, and 1.8% in 
nominal term. Corporate profits and employment situation have been improving; the 
unemployment rate fell to 4.0% in May 2006, the lowest level in eight years. The fiscal 
primary balance is expected to improve from -4.4% in FY2001 to -2.4% in FY2006. 
These figures indicate that renewed economic expansion is getting back on track of stable 
economic growth (Figure 1-1). 
                   Figure 1-1 Progress of Potential Growth Rate 
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B. Current Strategies to Secure Stable Economic Growth 
    Japan has announced five initiatives to sustain robust economic growth over the 
medium term. That is, 
      To implement a new monetary policy framework. The Bank of Japan attempts to 
      raise interest rates cautiously to overcome deflation pressure, while securing the 
     yen rate (=value of yen) in the world economy. 
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• To achieve fiscal consolidation. Government a tempts to maintain confidence in 
 the budgetary debt problem by aiming to achieve a primary budget surplus by the 
 early 2010s. 
 To promote structural reform while reducing income inequality and relative 
 poverty. To remedy the distortions resulting from firms' restructuring, the 
 government tries to dissolve the increased ualism in the labor market by 
 reducing the number of non-regular workers. 
 To upgrade national innovation. Japan aims at raising productivity growth directly 
 by increasing investment in innovation, strengthening legal structure of 
 intellectual property rights. 
• To strengthen the integration ofJapan in the world economy. In this respect, Japan 
 now targets doubling the FDI as a share of GDP by 2010 and addresses to open 
 up the market of M&A to foreign investors by allowing them to use their own 
 shares to finance mergers.
C. Factors of Economic Recovery 
    Why and how could Japan overcome the negative l gacy of collapse in the 1990s 
and finally restore the economic growth? Two types of structural reform have been 
effective to restore the economic upturn. One type of reform is the private sector-led 
economic recovery, where the government complemented the private initiatives with a 
series of regulatory reform. The other type of reform is the government-led structure 
reform including aseries of privatizations and regulatory eforms, where the private sector 
sought business opportunities and developed new businesses (Figure 1-2).
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    Basically, the private sector has a powerful driving force of reform. That is, the 
private sector has exercised the initiatives in improving the economic efficiency through 
dissolving the so-called three surplus issues (=surplus capacity, over-employment a d 
excessive debt) and restructuring boldly their finances, businesses oremployments to
enhance their corporate performances. 
    Especially, in the financial sector, many efforts have been devoted to disposing of 
non-performing loans (NPLs). The major banks' bad loan problems have been alleviated 
during the concentrated consolidation period (from FY2001 to FY2004) under the strong 
government support (=providing public funds). During this period of financial reform, 
the existing six big bank groups were consolidated into three big groups, which enabled 
the financial system in Japan to get back reliability of the financial market. 
    The other type is the government-led structural reform. Prime Minister Koizumi's 
leadership toward structural reform changed the atmosphere and circumstance of 
economy. His catchphrase of "shift from public to private sector" or "shift from central to 
local government" captured the public minds. Supported by high popularity, he 
promoted the following structural reform package.     
• To reform policy-based finance and review independent administrative nstitution. 
    • To increase the number of municipalities without local allocation tax. 
    • To reform the government assets and debts. 
    • To introduce Market Testing based on the "Law on Public Service Reform".     
• To promote E-government forthe purpose of enhancing administrative efficiency
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      through more ICT utilization. 
    Among them, promoting regulatory reforms is one of the key factors to 
substantially contribute to economic recovery. In addition to the elimination of the 
demand-supply adjustment regulations, which concroled almost all public utilities, more 
than 1500 items were deregulated during five years up to March 2006. Regulatory 
reforms were extended to areas of social regulations such as medical care, social welfare, 
education i this period. 847 "Special Zones for Structural Reform", in which related 
regulations arc to be exemplified in accordance with zones' specific haracteristics or 
circumstances, were approved. 
           2. Regulatory Reform in Japan : Process and Results 
A. Process of Regulatory Reform in Japan 
    In the 1990's, the emphasis inJapan had been focused on deregulation. The goal of 
such regulatory policies had been to move the economy from a model of state-led growth 
to a model of market-led growth characterized by a more efficient and flexible conomy. 
However, this transition had required the government as a whole to undertake 
comprehensive action-plan, while enhancing its capacity oward regulatory eform. Then, 
receiving OECD's recommendations, Japan adopted awhole-of-government approach 
toward better regulations and implemented a series of Three Year Program for Regulatory 
Reform in the 2000s. 
    'The Koizumi administration decided on many regulatory reforms in 2004. The 
highlights included; (a) establishment of inter-ministerial committee to serve as a 
headquarters for regulatory reform, (b) strengthening the power of the Council on 
Regulatory Reform (CRR), (c) introduction of Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), (d) 
promotion of the Special Zones Programme (SZP), and (e) selection of 17 priority reform 
areas. Among them, the Special Zones Programme, which was initiated by the Council on 
Regulatory Reform, is a unique approach. 
    The SZP has a local area -based approach to deregulation. Due to the SZP law 
approved in 2002, many regulations have been alleviated or lifted in geographically 
limited areas as a testing round. At that time, nation-wide r form was too difficult o be 
implemented at a burst, because most ministries and interest groups opposed or resisted 
such an initiative based on their interests. Therefore, the government adopted an 
ingenious programme which combined ecentralization policy with regulatory reform. 
The SZP has the potential to be effective in removing unnecessary regulations and in re-
                          21
vitalizing local economies. By 2005, 547 regulatory reform proposals had been accepted. 
Of them, 206 were tried in 709 special zones while the remaining 341 proposals were 
implemented nationwide from the beginning ('Table 2-1). However, it is still too early to 
judge the outcome of this initiative, which faces a number of obstacles. Firstly, the special 
interest groups may stall the implementation of key reforms such as management of 
hospitals by corporations. Secondly, there is a risk that these important reforms will not 
develop on a nation-wide basis by the resistance of the concerned ministries. Thirdly, 
there is also a possibility that the special zone initiative will not lead to local economic 
development as it deregulates only a narrow limited area. In order to secure this initiative 
as an important tool of regulatory reform the allowed items in the special zones should be 
generalized nation-wide quickly, avoiding unduly long periods of its evaluation. 
    Table 2-1 Reform Proposals Accepted Nation-wide under the Special Zone Initiative
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    The review of the existing regulations and administration simplification measures is 
underway through e-government policy which aims to make all existing administrative 
formalities and procedures available through Internet. However, most of them still remain 
at the level of one-sided services. With regard to reviewing existing regulations, although 
elimination of demand and supply balancing provisions associated with regulations of
public utilities and conversion from ex ante permits and licenses ystem to ex post 
control system have been major objectives of regulatory review, a survey shows that the 
number of ex ante permits and licenses has not been significantly reduced. 
    Recently, the government has promoted the "Market Testing" based on the law of 
Public Service Act and introduced the (Regulatory Impact Analysis) RIA system in 2004. 
The former is expected to benefit consumers, promote fiscal consolidation and provide
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new opportunities tothe business ector. The latter is expected toenhance the quality of 
regulation and contribute to reduce regulatory or administrative burden in terms of 
compliance costs. However, the progress of these schemes, which were implemented as
pilot projects or experimental rials, is too slow to be fully implemented. At the central 
level, only a few government services have not been exposed to competitive t ndering 
among private businesses. Although the number of RIAs increased to 79 in 2005, the 
number of the assessments i cluding quantitative analysis was only 4 (Table 2-2).
Table 2-2 State of Enforcement about the OECD's 1999 Recommendations
 1. Regulatory policy 
 • Supply and demand adjustment regulations eliminated inmost sectors 
 • The activity of comprehensive Three-Year Programs for Regulatory Reform. 
  Still remain based on an item by item approach. 
 • Policy Evaluation System (PEC) introduced in 2002, and Regulatory Impact 
  Analysis introduced in2004.But, we cannot still find the outstanding results. 
 2.Regulatory institutions 
 • The council of Regulatory Reform within the cabinet office negotiates directly with 
   the relevant ministries. Recently, the role of CRR seems to be retreating. 
 • Policy and regulatory functions remains under the control of the relevant line 
  ministries, although recommended to separate their functions by the OECD. 
 3.Regulatory tools and procedures 
 • The government has announced areview of APA (Administrative Procedure Act) 
 • A review of the administrative litigation system 
 • Introduction f Public Comment Procedure (1999) and No Action Letter system 
  (2001)
B. Position of Japan in the World Wide Regulatory Reform 
    Product market regulations-defined as regulations that have the potential to reduce 
competitions in all sectors of the economy-and Labor Market Regulation-defined as the 
strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) for regular as well as temporary 
employment contracts-have b en found to impose significant burdens on the domestic 
and international economy. 
    OECD's empirical studies how that countries with relatively restrictive and costly 
product market regulations tend to be associated with restrictive employment protection 
policies. Then, how far has Japan advanced in regulatory reform? G.Nimletti's group 
developed the detailed indicators of regulation to estimate he degree of regulatory eform
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from an international perspective. They adopted the following steps for their quantitative 
analysis. (1)collection of the basic data and classification of the data into regulatory 
domains (e.g. state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, employment protection 
legislation), (2) definition of the detailed indicators, which constitute the basis for 
subsequent estimations, (3) estimation of the summary indicators for each regulatory 
domain and sub-domain, (4) estimation of the overall indicators for product market 
regulation and employment protection legislation, which provides the features of 
regulatory domains and the most synthetic measure of regulation. The completion of the 
first two steps include some subjective judgments, while the last two steps are relatively 
objective since multivariate analysis techniques are used to estimate the score of degree of 
regulation. According to their 1999 report, Japan had already taken the middle position 
in the OECD countries regarding both product market and labor market (Figure 2-1). 
This position should be evaluated, since the initial regulatory conditions in 1975-1985 
had been far behind among them(Figure 2-2-1). But Japan was rated as the tenth most 
liberal country along with Sweden according to the OECD's measurement i  2003 
(Figure 2-2-2). 
      Figure 2-1 Product Market Regulation a d Employment Protection Legislation 
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Figure 2-2 Progress of Product Market Reform- A Change from Initial Conditions 
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    As for Labor Market Regulation, Japan has promoted regulatory reform to enhance 
fluidity of labor market through alleviating a series of labor laws including the Dispatch 
related laws. Strict employment protection legislations seemed to have deprived the 
industries of opportunities to flexibly respond to the changing economic circumstances. 
The revised Dispatch law in 2004 and development of dispatch business appear to have 
contributed to it, while employment protection legislation for regular workers has not 
been reviewed substantially. This ambivalent measures has raised dualism in labor market, 
which has been criticized as inequality problems-household's income, regional gaps etc.-
by the opposite political parties. 
    Regulatory reform in Japan has progressed to some extent, while it has raised new 
issues such as imbalance between deregulated industries and protected industries, income 
inequality and labor market dualism. In addition, important public utilities with 
networks as well as agriculture, healthcare and education still have remained not to be 
enough deregulated or open. Nevertheless, the long term efforts to promote regulatory 
reform have led to improving the fundamental index of micro-macro economy in Japan.
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C. Results of Regulatory Reform- Consumer Welfare and. Productivity 
    Some positive results are measurable and striking. The Economic and Social 
Research Institution (ESRI,Cabinet Office) tried to estimate the effects of implementing 
some of the major changes in terms of consumer surplus. The latest estimate in 2006, 
which confirmed the effects in mobile telephony, trucking, domestic airlines, car 
inspections, electric power, gas, oil, securities commission, insurance, beverages and 
foods, etc., is that these reforms as a whole increased consumer surplus by JPY 15-7 
trillion, or JPY 131,000 per capita: this amounts to about 4% of GDP (Table 2-3). 
Consumer benefits induced by regulatory eforms are most striking in telecoms.
Table 2-3 Consumer Surplus between 1987-2000
unit: 100 million yen
Secrnr 1987 1988 1990 1 i991 1992 1993 1 1994
E=
Domestic Telewms
t589
98$$ 1 2741 18 I 2.123 2.4391 2.214
lntcnationalTelccouts 6941 6531 341 137 13 8f
Ttansporcation
Domestic Aviation I 495 461
MOT1'rar Svstem 1 I
Truck -1.621  1391 -965 -2, 323 6,327
Rail 771 728 9591.... 902 1.301 1.523 1, 366 L 520
ITaxi
Energies
F,lcctricity I I
Gas I
Petropt'oduct 706
Firsancc Stock Broketaee Fcc I 1 614
Rice I iFood &BentageATfol 354 39e 19
eai 7281 276+5-32,09 I 4.6693, 171 152.814,3515
note 1. Figures in each year indicate the difference between the concerned yean and 
     previous year. 
   2. Blank cell means that regulatory reform was not implemented yet. 
   3. Figures of 2000 are expected values. 
                     source- Cabinet Office (2003), Report on the Policy Impact Analysis
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    Another benefit resulting from regulatory eforms i the increase ofTFP (total factor 
productivity) of the regulated industries. The ESRI also tried to estimate the impact of 
regulatory reforms on the changes of value-added share and the growth rate of TFP in 
each sector. It was summarized by the report on the assessment of structural reform in 
2006. There, after setting the regulatory index (1-0), calculating the TFP (the 
estimation of ATFP by using Cobb-Douglas type production function and SNA 
classification in Japan) by sector dynamically, and doing multivariate statistics (principal 
component analysis) of the past growth of TFP, the report reached the following 
conclusions (Figure 2-3, Figure 2-4). 
      Sectors, where regulatory eform has been advanced, have high productivities. 
      If regulatory index decreases by0.1 (standard year, 1995), the growth rate ofTFP 
      will increase by 0.14% (0.19% in the case of non-manufacturing). 
      Regulatory eform has a large scope to bring in productivity gains in some sectors 
      such as finance, insurance, real estate, construction, agriculture and electricity.
Figure 2-3
20%
15%
0M
0.5%
-0.5%
-1 .0%
n 
m m
-2 .0%
0
-2 .5%
-30%
Interrelation between progress of regulatory reform and TFP growth rate 
(1995-2002) 
I rG etc. L
_ - ~, Aviation] T
elecommunications " -f1 
          -Electricity, • a 
"`V ... • n 
              . • Civil engineering dustry_'... ~  
      Retail                            medical care (pnvat2 Water supply', 
                                                              r.. • A 
                          . As a ucatron                                 A (private, non-profit) 
    land f mass media                  (newspapers, press), ~~                                     nstruction' ' 
•
 other 
agriculture
Ri & whoot supply
  Construction 
AA 
f,
0.2 04 us 0.8 1 12
2002 regulatory indicator (bench mark: 1995)
14
  • enutadure 1995@002 A enutaciure 1995-2102       
In, (menulaolure 19952002) .-.. line (non manufaoWre 1 9 95- 20 021
Industrial sectors with zero index value are excluded here (as of 1995 or as of 2002). 
Main types of industry are extracted from JIP2006. 
         source: Cabinet Office (2006), Report on the Assessment of Structural Reform 6.
27
 50% r
 4.0% 
 3.0% 
20% 
 1.0% 
 0.0% 
-1 .0% 
-20%
note
03 
 as
Figure 2-4 The effect of Regulatory Reform on the change of TFP
non-manufacture
      sp
     ~3w od$m fiP d2_.3 z.,m 
           2 020
1 
1 
/ 
i.. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
i 
1
manufacture
IL
   -' @3 
_ 2
3 03 N_ 
              3l
Part of oblique line means effect of regulatory reform on TFP growth. 
The other part means other factors of TFP growth. 
         source: Cabinet Office (2006), Report on the Assessment of Structure Reform 6.
    Japan should accelerate regulatory reform focused on the non-manufacturing sectors 
to further enhance the productivity and competitiveness. 
    In spite of the above results, actual average labor productivity still remains at the 
level of 84% of the U.S average in 2003 (Figure 25).
28
      Figure 2-5 Growth rate of productivity in OECD countries 
    Japan's TFP is below the average of sixteen countries. 
    Labor productivity is high, however, among the technology, Intensive manufactures. 
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3. Conditions for Success of Re gulatory Reform -Theory and Practice
A. Design of Regulatory Reform and Privatization 
    Regulatory eform and privatization policy have the same roots, the so-called market 
failures uch as natural monopoly, negative externalities, public goods and asymmetry of 
information. To remedy them, the government intervenes in the market. Regulatory 
policy and public ownership (management) areregarded as two big methods of the state 
intervention. However, facing the change of economic and social environments, many 
advanced countries have been aware that governments themselves failed to remedy in 
these public policy areas. As a result, deregulation r privatization emerged as effective 
measures to overcome government failures. But, simple deregulation or privatization 
might lead to re-emergence of market failures and damage the public interests. This 
implies that the scheme of regulatory reform or privatization should be designed 
deliberately, taking account of some complementary measures. Among them, the most 
important measure isto create a competitive market, and to convert existing regulatory 
policies into new ones uitable for competition.
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    The government could implement such policy innovation by making use of various 
competition policies in accordance with market structure and market conduct. We have 
learned the following measures from experiences of reforms. (1) Duopoly policy (BT vs. 
Mercury, NTT vs. KDDI), (2) policy of oligoplolistic competition (e.g. bank, insurance, 
and public utilities uch as airlines), (3)policy of establishing a contestable market (sectors 
of natural monopoly), (4) structural separation (public transport, electricity, info-
communication), (5)franchise bidding (local public utilities), (6)market esting 
(government services), (7) asymmetric regulation for natural monopoly and so on. To 
create competitive market has been a decisive and consistent factor of success 
    The importance of competition policy has been recognized in many economic 
literatures. For example, J. Vickers and G. Yarrow pointed out that the change of 
ownership works only on one factor of improving corporate performance, although it is 
likely to have significant effect upon market conduct. Its success depends upon the 
market structure (whether competition is effective or not) and regulatory policy (whether 
other substantive market failures are absent or not). They concluded that, "the main 
message, therefore, issimply that managerial incentive structures are determined via a 
complex set of interactions among factors that induce the type of ownership, the degree 
of product market competition, and the effectiveness of regulation°. This view is also the 
case of regulatory reform. 
    From this viewpoint, he cube model proposed by A.P. Otto and K.B. Hartley is 
simple to understand the essence ofprivatization (Figure 3-1). According to their model, 
economic effects of privatization are influenced by the form of ownership (-'P-A 
relationship), market structure (-competitive circumstance), and change of purposes of 
the concerned firm (--public interest or profitability). They describe privatization as a 
movement of reform from a point B (min-min-min) to a point A (max-max-max). 
However, we can not expect he Pareto Optimality in the real business world. We should 
search the approximate equilibriums ( econd best) in the real market since deregulation is 
not carried out completely and the public-owned enterprise is not privatized thoroughly 
(Figure 3-2, Figure 3-3).
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Figure 3.1 The Cube Model
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    In such circumstances, Government has several methods to achieve their policy goal. 
One method is to replace xisting regulatory policies or tools with regulatory alternatives 
such as incentive regulation (price-cap regulation, yardstick regulation), which enables 
actual or fictitious competition in a monopolistic market. Especially, reform of 
interconnection charge (e.g. the so-called efficient component pricing rule or the long-
run incremental cost rule based on the forward-looking cost) is very important o 
accelerate entry into the network industries, The other methods are to strengthen 
oligopolistic ompetition by fostering a competitive rival (duopoly) or to implement 
structural separation. The method which makes existing market with heavy sunk cost 
more contestable should be added to this basket.
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Figure 3-2 Share of State-Ownership 
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          Figure 3-3 The Modified Cube Model 
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big public utilities in the
1980s. The results are as follows; the privatization of telecom (NTT) has been very 
successful. The privatization of rail (JR) has been also moderately successful, but the 
privatization oftobacco (JT) is not successful enough. This corresponds tothe degree of 
progress ofcompetition. 
    As for deregulations, they have resulted in positive outcomes. However, if we 
observe closely, some deregulated industries uch as distribution, land freight, marine 
shipping, and rail have decreased the value added shares (Figure 3-4). These industries 
seem to hold some troubles to create sound competitive markets. As for distribution, the 
government stopped eregulation u der the political agenda of re-vitalization f regional 
economies. The difficulties of introducing competition (JR group) and realization of 
excessive competition (land freight, taxi) should be regarded as the other easons. 
    In summary, it is essential to decide an appropriate set of regulatory policy and 
competition policy in accordance with existing market structure in implementing 
structural reform. This is the core point of experiences in Japan. 
   Figure 3-4 Interrelationship between Progress of Regulatory Reform and Change of 
            Value-added Share              
Interrelation between PRP and CVS (comparison of 1995 with 2002)
180
180
140
  120 
10 
C 
w 1.00 0 
r 
8080 a 
m " 
Ban
0,40
020
um
change of 
value added share 
(from right axis)
I I
advanced
regulatory index
(1995=1)
anced industries non-advanced
m ~ 3 m m 3° d. 3~ °5 5. a 3. a °- d m 
e. ° 3 a m m Z 3 
              m ~ ,~ m z
source', Cabinet Office (2006), Report on the Assessment of Structural Reform 6
33
20%
15%
1.0%
0.5% pci 
c 
m 
am a 
n m 
a 
m
-ts%
-20%
-15%
C. The FTC's Experiences 
    The FTC (Fair Trade Commission) has enlarged its scope and strengthened its
enforcement in parallel of structural reform. The FTC succeeded in promoting 
competition i  the field of ADSL. The warning of the FTC that NTT should not refuse 
or delay the request of entrants accelerated competition around ADSL and gave an 
opportunity for the rivals such as Yahoo Japan and KDDI to compete the NTT group 
with new business models uch as service of zero-equipment cost imposed on users. Due 
to this competition, the level of ADSL charge fell drastically in a short ime and the users 
of ADSL increased rapidly. 
    On the other hand, in the case of airlines, the FTC did not secure effective 
competition sufficiently. In spite of the FTC's warning to the carriers, new entrants such 
as the Skyline and the Air-Do were suffered from the predatory price settings by the 
carriers. As a result, many users have not gained by tariff cutting in the airline sector. The 
FTC failed to control the merger plan between the JAL and the Japan Air System. 
Although the FTC allowed it by imposing some constraints, a change of market structure 
to the duopoly market of JAL and ANA, however, has not led to better performance of 
Their firms and the increase ofconsumer benefits.
                  4. Importance of Competition Policy 
A. Current Challenges of the FTC: 
    To overcome a conflict between restrictive r gulation and competition, and to re-
enforce the FTC's independence, the FTC was replaced as an "extra ministerial body" of 
The Cabinet Office in 2003. The FTC has traditionally concentrated its attention on the 
violations which caused the greatest economic harm, namely cartels and bid rigging. 
However, The FTC has tried to keep abreast of novel policy challenges. 
    The revised AMA (Anti .Monopoly Act) in 2005 has enabled the FTC to enlarge its 
coverage and strengthen the enforcement of competition law. As key policy issues, it 
included the review of the scope of exemptions from competition law, the review of non-
competitive tendencies in regulation ("supply-demand" balancing provisions for 
controlling entry and exit) and the review of administrative guidance. The new revised law 
in 2006 gave the new powers to address official involvement in bid-rigging against 
administrative tolerance of collusion. Private suits are now authorized to seek orders and 
many suits have been attempted. Concerning the tools to enforce the law more effectively, 
the new law has raised the level of surcharges imposed on violations of the law, and 
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introduced a leniency programme, which is 
more into line with the levels of deterrence 
this, the Whistleblower Protection Act came
expected to bring competition enforcement 
in many other OECD countries. Related to 
into force in 2006.
B. First Contact to Network Industries 
    The FTC has a power to interfere in the area of natural monopoly or "inherent 
monopoly". This is very important because this area remains no to be exposed to the 
storm of deregulation in spite of the principles of "eliminating economic regulations and 
keeping social regulation to a minimum" and converting ex ante regulation to ex post 
control". Another eason is that it is very difficult o introduce competition without he 
structural regulations, which the FTC has not adopted till now. 
    Repeal of the "inherent monopoly" exemption enabled the FTC to pay more 
attention to issues of network industries. The FTC's Study Group on Government 
Regulations and Competition Policy researched network industries and required to 
eliminate distinction between carriers with and without physical facilities, to secure 
transparent i terconnections a d to allocate resources such as spectrum through bidding. 
In addition, this study group criticized the holding company structure of NTT group in 
terms of competition and urged that the holding company should reduce its holdings in 
mobile telephone service (NTT DoCoMo). 
    Actually, due to repeal of the "inherent monopoly" exemption, a part of power 
generation markets was liberalized with an auction system. This change xpanded the 
potential application of the AMA in other network industry settings, too. Notably, the 
FTC examined the claims that the NTT group disturbed entrants about ADSL facilities, 
services and pricing practices. Here, the FTC has issued guideline jointly with the 
MPHPT which describes such conducts that would violate both the AMA and the 
Telecoms law. Similar guidelines about electric power and natural gas have been arranged 
between the FTC and the METI (Figure 4-1). However, co-ordination with regulatory 
authorities is still informal. The protocols requiring joint action, or arrangement on 
certifying about market power or abuse of dominant position are not defined explicitly.
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C. Current Challenges 
    Although restructuring or divestures of monopoly firms is authorized by the special 
rule for a "monopolistic situation" (Sec.8-4), this has never been applied to regulate 
natural monopolies. If the FTC has a will to expand competition policy into network 
industries, the FTC should consider how to mandate divestiture under Sec.3. To make 
network industries more competitive, the FTC should prepare the powerful structural 
measures beyond the conduct controls. 
    As for "administrative guidance", explicit interference in the market through 
administrative guidance appears to be declining, but change is difficult to identify. 
According to the 1994 Guideline, the relevant ministries should have sufficient prior 
consultation with the FTC to ensure that government regulations are not replaced by 
anti-competitive administrative guidance. However, the FTC does not report any 
significant case studies. The FTC is required to strengthen overseeing of tacit or hidden 
administrative guidance that is incompatible with competition. 
    The FTC should strengthen the criminal penalties. The threat of penalties does not 
yet deter violation of the law effectively, shown in the repeated rigging bids. In the 7 cases 
referred since 1990, over 60 individuals were prosecuted, but execution of all of their 
sentences was suspended. Ineffective deterrence invites repeated violations. In general, the 
capacity of the FTC to prosecute violations would be strengthened, if the AMAs criminal 
penalties are to be applied credibly.
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5. Interrelation between Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy
    We have three big areas where `structural reform" overlaps 
are (a) reform of network industries, (b) outsourcing of public 
reform accompanied by market openness.
competition policy. They 
services and (c)regulatory
A. Network Industries 
    As a result of regulatory reform, many economic and social regulations have been 
deregulated. However, the public utilities, especially network industries except info-
telecommunication sector, have not experienced radical reforms and remains as inefficient 
natural or regional monopoly which has dominant position in their markets. Although 
OECD recommended that the regulatory framework for network industries should still 
be improved through structural unbundling, Japan has not adopted any action. The 
ministries insist hat regulations have already worked sufficiently well. Consequently, the 
public utilities with network have been still inefficient and low-productive compared with 
those in the advanced countries (Figure 5-1). This is reflected by high prices of public 
utilities like the rates of electricity and gas. 
    OECD recommended that in order to dissolve recent labor productivity gap 
between Japan and the U.S. in the service sector ( 84% to the U.S. average in 2006), 
regulatory eform should be promoted further. However, to achieve better performance in 
non-manufacturing sectors, the FTC has to take an initiative for seeking necessary 
conditions for competition i cooperation with the controlling ministries. Implementing 
structure unbundling as well as strengthening the enforcement force into these sectors 
may be a promising method if the current approach by the jurisdictions does not work 
sufficiently (Figure 5-2).
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Figure 5-2 Challenges to Enhance Non-Manufacturing Regulation 
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B. Front-line of Structural Reform 
    Regulatory Reform has been often promoted through the use of market-type 
mechanism. Alternative measures have been adopted to make public sector more effective 
or efficient. Market-type mechanism includes outsourcing (contracting-out), public-
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private partnerships (PPPs) and vouchers. The other market-type mechanisms include 
market of transferable p rmits like emission trade market of greenhouse gas. The driving 
forces behind this phenomenon are the needs for the government to secure increased 
value for money in their operations and to ensure that public service should supplied 
more cost-effectively or customer oriented. Outsourcing is the practice whereby the 
government contracts with private providers for the provision of services to government, 
or directly to citizens on behalf of the government (Figure 5-3). This concept includes 
various terminology such as competitive t ndering, contracting-out. This method has 
been applied to blue collar support service (building cleaning, catering), professional 
services (ICT), and core government functions (prison). 
                  Figure 5-3 Outsourcing of Government Service
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                                 Source. OECD Secretariat c lculations based on OFS Data. 
    PPPs refer to arrangement whereby the private sector finances, designs, builds, 
maintains, and operates infrastructure assets traditionally provided by the public sector. 
This bring a single private sector entity to undertake to provide public infrastructure 
assets for their whole life, generally 20-30 years. The private sector partner then charges 
an annual fee for the use of the infrastructure assets. This can be either paid by the 
government or through user charges, or combination of the two. PPPs are known as 
private finance initiatives (PFI). PPFs have been extensively used in the provision of 
transportation infrastructure, schools, hospitals, and sewage treatment facilities. 
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    Vouchers separate the provision of public services from its financing. The funding 
remains with the government in the form of a voucher that is issued to individuals and 
which entitles them to exchange the vouchers for services at a range of suppliers. The 
voucher holders choose among different suppliers and pay with the voucher. Vouchers 
have been used for the provision of low-income housing assistance, primary and 
secondary education, and care services. 
     The use of these market-type mechanisms is expected to shape up the government. 
However, According to an OECD analysis of member countries' experience, there are 
some decisive factors associated with the successful use of market-type mechanisms. 
Observing carefully, we can find an essential common basis among them. The existence of 
competitive market is paramount-outsourcing. PFIs also require competitive biddings in 
their process (e.g. marketing test) and the voucher holders must be able to exercise a 
genuine choice of suppliers. 
    Market-type mechanisms have been applied to a wide range of government 
functions. On the other hand, a number of governance-related issues (staff issues 
associated with outsourcing, risk accompanied with the transfer of management etc.) have 
occurred. However, these reforms will be inevitable because the efficiency gains which can 
be either in the form of decreased costs, improved service quality levels or improved 
allocative efficiency are substantial. On this point, competition policy support 
establishing better environments in these reforms.
C. M&A and Competition Policy 
   The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) announced "Japan 
Globalization Strategy" in 2006. The report aims at enhancing Japan's international 
competitiveness. This report includes arange of proposals to obtain such benefits: 
      Improve and expand human resources; Establishing an environment that attracts 
      outstanding talent from other countries, Improving the immigration system, etc.. 
      Strengthen international competitiveness; Raising efficiency in agriculture, 
     implementing the third basic plan for science and technology, Doubling the stock 
      of inward foreign direct investment to5% of GDP by 2010, etc.. 
    • Strengthen the global competitiveness of regions in Japan; Increasing the number 
     of foreign tourists to Japan to 10 million by 2010, etc.. 
    • Foreign policy and contribution to international society; Creating an East Asian 
     Economic Zone, Accelerating negotiation ofEconomic Partnership Agreement, 
      Reforming Overseas Development Assistance, tc..
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    Among them, the inward FDI problem is very important so as to maintain Japan's 
highly competitive position as a front-runner in global economy. The FDI becomes an 
increasing driver of global integration as multinational companies to implement global 
strategies. During the second half of the 1990s, the worldwide total of FDI tripled, led by 
a rise of cross-border M&As. Japan participated in this trend with its stock of inward FDI 
more than tripling from 3 trillion yen to 9.4 trillion yen between 1998 and 2002. 
Consequently, Japan's share of world FDI increased from 0.5% in 1998 to 1,2% in 2004. 
However, the impact of foreign affiliates in Japan has been limited by their number and 
size. Despite the increase, the stock of FDI in Japan as a share of GDP remains the lowest 
level in the OECD area at 3% (Figure 5-4). The Japan Investment Council (JIG) 
established the "Programme for the Promotion of the inward PDI in Japan" in 2003 and 
has tried to increase FDI till now. Although this programme includes improvement of he 
environmental forcross-border M&As as a key item, M&As have not proceeded asmuch 
as expected. Between 2002 and 2004, the sale of EU companies to foreign firms 
accounted for almost half of the total of cross-border M&As in value term, while the sale 
of US firms accounted for another one-fifth. In contrast, he Japanese share was only 
2.3% (Table 5-1). 
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Table 5-1 Cross Border Mergers and Acquisition 
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     Japan's low share reflects ome special factors. One reason is that Japan's M&A 
 market is originally small because of the unique business practice and corporate culture 
 which constitute aJapanese-style management. Japanese firms often take the negative 
attitude for the inward M&As, regarding them as "vulture funds". The second factor is 
the discriminate reatment of foreign firms in M&As. Non-cash transaction (exchange of 
shares) was not allowed in the case of foreign firms, even though such financing method 
accounted for 70% of M&As within domestic firms in 2002. The third factor is that 
Japanese companies still have the practice of cross-share holding in accordance with their 
group or Keiretsu, which is believed to make a barrier to the outside attackers. 
    But Last May, foreign companies was allowed to have the same rights as domestic 
firms in using non-cash transaction for M&As. This is called "triangular mergers". If 
foreign companies established their subsidiaries in Japan, they can use their parent 
company's stocks to acquire aJapanese company Allowing foreign firms to use non-cash 
transaction may significantly facilitate the inward FDI. 
    If so, a more transparent, merger guidelines or rules will be required. The 2003 
FTC's merger guideline has become gradually clear that match for the global standards in 
terms of safe harbor or HHI index. However, the process ofpre-notification consultation 
about mergers has not been sufficiently clarified. Merger control relies on prior 
consultation a d negotiation. It is said that the parties want to avoid the risk that the 
FTC will block their plans after they take the formal statutory procedure. To avoid 
opaque procedure, the FTC should adopt he kind of 2-phase investigation process which 
is popular in the EU. Another problem is related to the enforcement of merger control. 
The enforcement force relies on the discretion of competition authorities. Although the 
FTC have succeeded in cracking down on hard-core cartel and tendering collusion, in the 
field of M&As the FTC have not necessarily succeeded nough. 
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                             Conclusion 
    Regulatory Reform necessarily requires commitment of competition authorities in
order to achieve the expected results. However, to promote competition i  the public 
sector is not so easy because the real public sector has many complicated factors which do 
not adjust o market mechanism. Even if the regulated industries were liberalized, their 
markets might be away from competitive markets. There is a risk that market failure 
might re-emerge and impede a function of market mechanism. Therefore, in promoting 
regulatory reform, competition authorities should come to the front. 
    In turn, the successful competition policy can contribute to better egulation. If 
competition policy does not work well, regulatory reforms, even though they have fine 
menu and schemes, would go into a stall. In contrast, if competition policy works well, 
through improving economic performance, regulatory reforms would be accelerated 
further. In summary, regulatory eform should be complemented bycompetition policy 
and competition policy should be stregthened in parallel with regulatory eform. Both are 
correlated closely.
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